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PROF. BISCHEL: Do either of you wish to make any introductory
remarks with respect to the panel discussion?
MR. CooKENBOO: I would like to say a word about some numbers.
A figure of six percent was quoted on tax burden percentages. That is a
number which causes a lot of oil tax people to sit up in their seats. The
six percent reflects U.S. income tax divided by worldwide income; some
years it is six percent, others it is eight percent. We think it should be
either U.S. tax divided by U.S. income, or worldwide tax divided by
worldwide income. We have a survey of the 18 largest American companies which shows that on U.S. tax divided by U.S. income, the rate is
about 23 percent, which I think compares with an average rate of something like 37-40 percent for all American industry. That varies from year
to year too. It is not 48 percent, by the way, because the statutory rate
is not paid by people in businesses other than the oil business. I do not
know what would happen if you did a survey of the whole industry. It
might not be that high.
Now worldwide, you include both foreign and domestic taxes divided by foreign and domestic income. Worldwide taxes divided by
worldwide income was 55 percent in 1972. I hate to think how high it is
now.
One other point on section 482. The U.S. income tax is computed
on the basis of fair market value, not on the basis of posted prices; that
applies to all businesses. We do feel that section 482 does bear heavily
on us because we are under an obligation to demonstrate to the Internal
Revenue Service that the prices that our affiliates pay to their foreign
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brethren are, in effect, fair market prices. These are the prices we use
for determining U.S. income tax liability. We spend many man-hours
working on the problem of a fair market price and so does the Internal
Revenue Service. I am not sure what General Motors' problems are;
perhaps ours are more complex because of the highly integrated nature
of the oil industry. We have to try to decide what a fair open market
value is between willing arms-length buyers and sellers in an industry
where a large part of the transfer is within companies. Then we have this
posted market price thing; but there have been some rather vigorous
long-term revenue proceedings on this matter. So we think that our
affiliate transfer prices reflect market price.
MR. n'EscLAPON: I think I have a question for Mr. Cookenboo regarding the House Ways and Means Committee's proposal, however
flexible it may be at this point in time. When you drew your box there
with the oil-related income and the non-oil-related income, 1 one point I
think you made was that it removes the shelter effect of the foreign tax
credit against the unused non-oil-related income. Wouldn't you say that
since some of your non-oil-related activities are in low tax countries and
some in high tax countries, there should be some possibility to use some
of the tax credits generated by some of your operations in high tax
countries to shelter the income from some other operations in low tax
countries?
MR. CooKENBoo: I am not sure I understand your question. But
looking at the non-oil model, there may be some high taxes and some
low taxes. Within that, you could still average; but you cannot transfer
an unused credit from an oil operation on balance to a non-oil operation.
There is still the averaging in the non-oil operation. However, some say
most of those tend to be loss operations anyway when a company tries
to diversify into a business that it does not know anything about.
PROF. BISCHEL: Mr. Ross, let me get back to you. You indicated that
the U.S. effective rate for the taxation of oil companies is something in
the neighborhood of six percent plus and then you stated that there were
essentially no taxes paid on foreign source income but there are foreign
taxes paid.
MR. Ross: Yes, but no U.S. taxes.
PROF. BISCHEL: I take it that is in line with your concept of tax
neutrality.
MR. Ross: No, not necessarily.
PROF. BISCHEL: Could you elaborate on it?
MR. Ross: I do not think there is any quarrel between us, Mr.
Cookenboo. It is just that on the foreign source income the effective rate
is pretty close to zero, however you compute it.
1. See Cookenboo, supra at 223.
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MR. CooKENBOO: There is no quarrel between us that U.S. companies do not pay too much U.S. tax on their foreign operations.
That is true, although there may be some companies that do. Tax
rates on foreign oil producing operations are much higher than U.S. tax
rates, and foreign refining and marketing are concentrated in the five
or six largest countries around the world just like other industries. Those
tax rates are not significantly different from the U.S. rates. One may
be 55 percent and one may be 45 percent. Now, I am sure that would
be true for most any company.
MR. Ross: Yes, I think that is right for most any oil company.
MR. CooKENBoo: What about General Motors or those people?
MR. Ross: No, their effective rates tend to be such that there would
be some residual U.S. tax.
MR. CooKENBoo: Does their average effective foreign tax rate, that
is taxes paid to foreign countries divided by their foreign taxable income, tend to be somewhat below the U.S. rate?
MR. Ross: Yes.
MR. CooKENBOO: That certainly is not the case in the oil industry.
There are always exceptions.
MR. Ross: I find it a little distressing that the international oil
companies are largely in the forefront of taxation of foreign income
reform. I would have preferred to have had general reform of taxation
of foreign income, say as a part of the trade bill last year, which would
have set neutral U.S. tax principles across the board. Unfortunately, the
multinationals, including oil companies (but certainly a lot of others as
well) succeeded in having that postponed until the general tax reform,
and so the oil company situation is coming up in a context where our
general scheme for taxing foreign income has not, at least in my opinion,
been set right.
What I consider to be a neutral system for the United States would
be to eliminate deferral, to provide a full foreign tax credit as long as
there is a per-country or an overall credit, one or the other, but not giving the taxpayer the choice of the better, which he has now. Personally
I would be happy with either one as a neutral tax principle. There are
strong arguments for the overall and there are strong arguments for the
per-country credit. We have switched from one to the other many times
in our history and if this were a tax session we might usefully debate
the relative merits of per-country or overall credits for quite a while.
Whichever one we arrivb:l at, I would not allow foreign losses to offset
domestic income. I would hold them in suspense to offset foreign income
when it is earned. I would eliminate such extravagances as Western
Hemisphere Trade Corporation provisions. After 30 years in the Code,
nobody yet knows who benefits from the provisions, or why.
With this sort of an overall program the question would be "what
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is special about the oil companies?" At that point I would be pushed to
a difficult judgment. The oil companies and the government have acted
for nearly a quarter of a century on the premise that what they paid to
the Middle Eastern countries were income taxes. We are going to change
that; we ought to change it for the future. I find it hard to look at the
taxes that are being paid now and to consider them to be technically
regarded as an income tax. Now, there are many ways to cure this
situation. One way is with a series of limitations which are designed to
say that we are not going to judge whether or not it is an income tax,
but that we are going to quarantine those payments so that whether they
are taxes or royalties, they cannot give you any benefit against other
income. That is the quarantine theory. I am looking for words that I
know will be familiar to an international law audience. Another way
would be to say that they will not be allowed to offset tax on any other
kinds of income. Another way would be the Treasury way, which Mr.
Patrick would have articulated for you if he had not been required to
stay in Washington. That is, the Treasury would use a mathematical
formula to convert anything above 48 percent from a credit into a royalty.
The essential question is what to do with the excess credits. Under
present law, there are activities that are not taxed internationally, like
shipping. Oil companies can run so-called captive tanker fleets and use
oil tax credits to offset tax on earnings from those activities and to avoid
tax on them. What would happen if full taxes had to be paid on income
earned from shipping operations? And if the result is less interest in
shipping operations, how much less, and would it matter to the country?
These are the issues that have to be considered. While I regard the
foreign tax credit as part of a neutral system, it is just one part of it.
MR. CooKENBoo: I think that we could agree that you cannot just
look at the fact that Company X pays no foreign tax and conclude that
there is something wrong. Suppose Company X operated only in Ruratania and Ruratania's tax rate is 48 percent. Assume, also, that Ruratania's tax code is an exact duplicate of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.
That is the only foreign operation that Company X has. Then, it is not
going to pay any U.S . income tax on foreign operations. Now that does
not mean that the tax system is bad and there are inequities in it. That
is just the way it is. Now there are some people who think that any U.S.
company should pay some minimal taxes to the United States because
they should help to defray the costs of operation of the government.
That is a side issue. The fact that a company does not pay any U.S. tax
on its foreign operations is not per se evidence that the tax laws need to
be changed.
Now Mr. Ross' questions are the ones that we need to ask. Given
the basic principle of the foreign tax credit to try to avoid international
Published by SURFACE, 1974
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double taxation, we still have within the law certain problems. He raised
one on shipping. I think maybe I can give you an answer on shipping.
Last fall I found that our people were evaluating a tanker program on
the assumption that we would not have to pay U.S. income taxes on our
international shipping. These are tankers that go anywhere in the world,
unlike U.S. flag tankers, which we use within the United States, and
unlike French flag tankers. (The French have some kind of requirement
that part of their oil must be imported in French ships.) The business
under consideration was a real international tanker business. Now, I
suggested that there is lots of talk in Washington-pressure in Washington-to change various laws like Mr. Ross' suggestion of eliminating socalled deferral which might subject our U.S. tanker fleet to taxation in
the United States. I suggested that perhaps we ought to run a sensitivity
on the economics. The man in the logistics department said it would be
a waste of time. If we have to pay a U.S. tax, we cannot compete. If we
have to pay U.S. taxes we are out of the international shipping business.
That is because our major foreign-owned competitors do not have to pay
taxes. We would end up chartering. But, is it, or can it be in the national
interest not to have a U.S.-controlled international tanker fleet? On
such specific questions apart from the basic principle of the foreign tax
credit, the issue should be addressed in this way: how do they affect the
U.S. national interest?
MR. Ross: I think that if you assume that answer, then our government has to say to itself, who are these principal competitors? Are their
home countries happy to be giving the people who run shipping from
their countries tax exemptions? Should shipping at an international
level be a tax-exempt type of business? Should we encourage that type
of international tax system where only people who are exempt will be
involved in shipping or should we get together with the United Kingdom, the Nether lands, Greece, wherever there are people who know
about shipping, and decide that maybe we ought to have a multilateral
convention that imposes some level of taxation on this international
activity? I think that is a legitimate question to think about.
MR. CooKENBoo: Now that is the legitimate and, indeed, the only
way to solve the problem without damaging the competitive ability of
the American shipper, because a unilateral action by the United States
will not affect the tax laws of the other countries.
MR. Ross: There are people who would say that if Americans who
undertake business activities do not want to pay some U.S. tax, we do
not care if those activities are undertaken by American companies. Let
somebody else run the shipping industry. Why is it important that
Americans have a big stake in international shipping? I do not subscribe to it, but there are those who do. They would say unless business
profits are taxed at a fair rate we do not want Americans to engage in
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them. The way you would get them not to engage, assuming Mr. Cookenboo is correct, is simply to apply a tax on their operations. Then they
would not engage in the business.
MR. n'EscLAPON: On this question of international shipping, the
determination was made by the Administration when they pushed for
and got the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 (with the capital construction
fund provisions) because it was found, as I recall, that less than five
percent of the U.S. cargo was transported on U.S. bottoms and that 75
percent of the U.S. flag merchant vessels engaged in foreign trade were
over 20 years old. For national security reasons as well as for a host of
commercial reasons, it was found not to be acceptable and thus the
argument of "barn burning" does not seem to have much favor with the
Administration.
MR. Ross: I would caution you on one thing. I think one of the big
problems in this area is that we talk about Washington, the U.S.
Government, the Administration, and we must remember that there are
a lot of different institutions in Washington and in the Government. The
Administration often does not speak with one voice. I think one of the
things the Church Committee has shown is how, even within the same
department, there are differences. They have just recently released some
documents on the Iranian consortium showing that at the same time a
case was being brought under the antitrust laws to break up a cartel
arrangement, there were others who were trying to foster another cartel
arrangement. Our Government has many people with many different
views and I think one of the problems is that we are now in a very
difficult era where we do not really know what our national interest is
vis-a-vis many multinational corporations. We do not want to acknowledge that there is good and bad and that it has to be sorted out very
carefully and patiently. Everybody is looking around for the white hats
and the black hats and simple solutions, and there just are not any.
These things are part of the fabric of our national and international
relations and I guess we need more debates and symposia to figure out
what it really is we want.
PROF. BISCHEL: Mr. Ross, would you perhaps care to categorize the
oil companies here as perhaps having the black hat put on them and
being unduly discriminated against with respect to having their foreign
tax credit and their own deferral changed when, for instance, ITT and
other large U.S. multinational corporations are not being subjected to
that same sort of scrutiny?
MR. Ross: I would not go that far. In the context of an energy crisis
and interest in energy taxation generally, domestic as well as foreign; it
is legitimate to take up the oil tax rules. The biggest part of what the
Ways and Means Committee can do concerns domestic oil operations,
not foreign. When they are talking about windfall profits taxes and

Published by SURFACE, 1974

7

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 2, No. 2 [1974], Art. 7

1974]

Panel Discussion

257

repeal of percentage depletion, it is the domestic side that they are
critical of, because I would say that when all is said and done the
amount of increased taxes that are likely to come out of the foreign side
is probably quite minor relative to what could happen domestically. So,
I think it is legitimate, as part of your national focus on these companies, to consider the oil tax rules.
MR. CooKENBOO: On the question of the relative importance-as the
bill stands, the dollars and cents effects on us are the same order of
magnitude, both foreign and domestic.
MR. Ross: Is that right?
MR. CooKENBoo: Yes, particularly if we went to the Administration's 48 percent limit on the foreign tax credit instead of 52.8 percent
in the Ways and Means Bill. Then, I presume the foreign effect might
actually be a little larger. But these are both very serious matters.
PROF. BISCHEL: It is my understanding, however, and in talking
recently with Mr. Patrick, that ending the deferral per se would not add
a substantial amount of revenue because of the overall tax credit limitation. It would add some additional revenue from foreign sources, not an
enormous amount, particularly when you consider currency restrictions
and other sorts of problems with respect to taxation.
MR. Ross: It depends on what you mean by elimination of deferral.
I tend to think the conclusion you state is probably right but the question is how you eliminate it and what the provisions are that go with it.
If that were the only change, I would guess that the oil companies would
be glad to take it, that elimination of deferral would not have a major
impact for them because they have very high effective rates of foreign
tax. Somebody read a quotation before about passions. It appears to be
the passion of multinational corporations headquartered in the United
States to maintain deferral. If they would once acknowledge that they
are Americans from a tax standpoint and allow deferral to be eliminated
you might get more rationality into the whole scheme than we have now.
I would say that even if elimination of deferral raised no revenue, which
is not likely, it would still be a beneficial change because it would assure
the taxpaying public that there is nothing peculiar about foreign operations. Income would be reported on a current basis just as with operations in upstate New York. However, the companies have not seen the
benefits to them from elimination of deferral.
MR. CooKENBOO: Well, my company does not happen to be on the
per-country basis, so I am speaking second-hand here. I am pretty sure
that the elimination of deferral, that being the only change, would have
a very severe economic impact on many oil companies. Combine it with
what you have in the Ways and Means bill and you would have a very
severe economic impact on all of us.
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MR. Ross: How would it have an impact if that was the only
change?
MR. CooKENBOO: For a company on the overall basis that has surplus tax credits, an elimination of deferral would be a matter of no
consequence.
MR. Ross: That is exactly my point.
MR. CooKENBOO: But for one on the per-country basis, which has
operations in low tax countries or low tax industries, it could have a very
substantial effect.
MR. Ross: The per-country is in ill repute with the oil companies
for obvious reasons. People incurring losses in Ruratania and subsidizing that by not paying tax on income earned in New York is no longer
something which anybody really thinks is going to stay in the law. The
Administration has come out against it twice now, both last April and
recently in February. The Kennedy Administration went after it in 1963.
The Ways and Means Committee went after it in the House version of
the 1969 Act. I think its life is about done.
MR. CooKENBOO: You are stipulating a case where you are doing
other things besides eliminating the deferral. If you eliminate the percountry and put everyone on the overall, then a company that has
surplus tax credits, I suppose, would not be affected.
MR. Ross: What is so wrong with eliminating deferral, eliminating
foreign losses against U.S. income, and providing for only an overall
limitation?
MR. CooKENBoo: I should really have a tax lawyer to speak on this
because it does not have much economic content one way or the other.
I do know some tax lawyers who do not call it deferral; they call the
elimination of it acceleration. They say what you really are doing is
accelerating the tax on income earned by foreign incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. The present law is like taxation of subsidiaries
in the United States. I am no lawyer and I do not want to press that
one way or the other.
On the foreign loss deduction, I believe the Administration proposal, insofar as it relates to oil exploration, is that the losses would
continue to be deductible but that the intangible development cost
deduction would be recaptured by the Treasury in the event of a successful discovery. There is a national interest reason, in my view, for
continuation of the loss deduction; and that is diversification of international supply. If the United States succeeds in "Project Independence"-and I think that we all hope that it will, so we will not have to
worry about more Arab oil embargoes or, if not political embargoes, at
least the quadrupling prices within a year-then you might say, "Why
do we care about diversifying world petroleum supplies?" The world
economic system, the world monetary system, the economies of France,
Published by SURFACE, 1974
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Germany and Japan and other large trading partners would still be
subject to the same sort of political and economic pressures that they
are subject to today. Those political and economic pressures could have
decided reverberations on the United States. American foreign policy
could be affected by a threat to do something to the international monetary system. Diversification of supply is a valid national goal; and deduction of foreign exploration losses from U.S. income, at least in the
views of some oil companies, is a device to assist them in doing that.
The Administration proposal, as I understand it, would recapture the
loss deductions that were on productive properties.
MR. n'EscLAPON: I would like to ask a question about the competitive advantages you mentioned being possibly eliminated by the Ways
and Means Committee proposals. You mentioned the French and Dutch
tax exemption system on foreign source income. If I recall correctly there
is a corrollary: "If they do not tax the foreign income they also do not
allow the losses to be taken into account." Of course, not every oil
operation is profitable from the start. I would like to ask the question:
Do the foreign countries like France, or the Netherlands, have a depreciation allowance and an intangible cost allowance the same way as the
United States has?
MR. CooKENBoo: Doesn't France require that it be spent on exploration within five years? Various countries have various things. The U.S.
package at the moment has percentage depletion and we can expense
intangible development costs. That is, for example, when you drill an
oil well, the contractor's fee for punching the hole in the ground is an
intangible cost. The equipment at the top of the well, the meters or the
pump, is tangible. We can expense the intangibles currently. We now
have either the overall or the per-country limitation method for the
foreign expenses. You can deduct an overall foreign loss from U.S. income if you happen to be on the overall basis and have the misfortune
to have an overall foreign loss. You can deduct it country by country if
you are on the per-country basis. That is the U.S. package. In France,
they do not tax foreign source income to my knowledge; but domestically they have a depletion allowance which has a plowback criterion
within it. You are entitled to depletion at 27 .5 percent. Germans, I
think, are encouraging their companies to go abroad. They have a loan
for exploration purposes which is not repayable in the event of failure.
It is repayable after six years in the event of success. In the United
Kingdom, I think, you can expense the tangibles but not the intangibles.
That is just the opposite of the United States. The Japanese have a
whole package of benefits including tax free loans and that sort of thing.
All of our major competitors have one kind of benefit or another.
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CHART 12
Summary Statement of Tax Treatment and Other Incentives for Foreign Petroleum
Operations by Companies Domiciled In:

Does not tax.
France
Other Incentives:
None for private companies. (Government finances wholly-owned government company and
owns substantial interest in large private company.)
Taxes on overall basis with credit.
(2) Japan
Other Incentives:
Exploration loans of up to 50% not repayable in
the event of failure; government guarantees of
bank loans for exploration and development; percentage depletion at 15% with reinvestment requirement; expensing of dry holes.
Does not tax.
(3) Netherlands
Other Incentives:
Allows deduction of foreign losses from domestic
income.
Taxes on per-country basis with credit.
(4) United Kingdom
Other Incentives:
Expensing of all pre-discovery costs; expensing of
plant and machinery expenditures; rapid depreciation of other post-discovery expenditures. Allows a form of averaging of foreign losses and profits similar to U.S. overall method. Allows deduction of a net foreign loss. (Government owns substantial interest in large private company.)
Taxes on per-country basis with credit.
(5) West Germany
Incentives:
Other
Outside the Common Market, exploration loans
up to 75%, not repayable in the event of failure
-50% of a loan may not be repayable in the
event of discovery; expensing of all exploration
costs; rapid depreciation of tangibles and intangibles. Allows deduction of a net foreign loss.

(1)

2. Testimony of W. L. Henry, Executive Vice President, Gulf Oil Corporation, before
the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, Feb., 1974. (Reprinted in AMERICAN
PETROLEUM INSTITUTE "ENERGY PROFITS, SUPPLY, AND TAXATION" 38 (1974).)
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United States

Taxes on per-country or the overall basis with
credit.
Other Incentives:
Percentage depletion; expensing of dry holes and
intangibles on producing wells (but no deduction
of pre-discovery costs other than dry holes, until
properties are abandoned). Allows deduction of a
net foreign loss.

Everybody is interested in diversifying supplies. Everyone has his own
package. I will say that as far as international exploration is concerned
the two most favorable are the German and the Japanese. It is understandable because they are two highly industrialized countries which,
especially in the case of Japan, find themselves very dependent on one
area of the world for energy. They are making every effort by government assistance, either in the tax code or through direct government
subsidy or loan, to encourage their nationals to go abroad.
MR. n'EscLAPON: Do you find on a worldwide basis that there is a
tendency among oil producing countries to shift somewhat from the
income tax basis to oil royalties like the Venezuelan system in which
part of your royalties are to be paid in oil?
MR. CooKENBoo: Perhaps Mr. Finlay can help me here because he
was a long-term Exxon international lawyer. I believe in all of our cases,
if the country is so inclined, it can take its royalty oil in kind. You will
remember that recently Kuwait and Abu Dhabi have held auctions for
oil and if the prices were not to their satisfaction, some of them did not
sell. The reason the prices were not to their satisfaction was that this
was royalty oil and we are obligated to buy royalty oil from them at the
posted price which would be $11.65 per barrel for light Arabian and
Persian Gulf oil. If they were to get a bid less than $11.65, it was better
to let us take it. I think they have the right to take the oil in kind in
many cases. Now that certainly is true in the United States. If you are
a landowner, you can take your royalty oil in kind. The Government
does take some of its oil in kind. In California, for example, for a good
many years they have been taking federal royalty oil or state royalty oil
as a source of oil for independent refineries. So, I think they could take
it if they wanted.
PROF. BISCHEL: Let me ask Mr. Cookenboo what would happen if
the oil companies were denied part of the current foreign tax credit if
they are on the overall basis. Literally, how would it affect their competitive position, for instance in Europe or the Far East, if they are operating in that area? In a sense, are American taxpayers perhaps subsidizing
the European oil consumers by allowing this extra amount of foreign tax
credit? Would the tax be passed on? Would the production tax, for
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instance, from Saudi Arabia be passed on to consumers or would it be
eaten by their companies?
MR. CooKENBoo: A U.S. tax increase on U.S. operations abroad, a
unilateral thing, could not be passed on because it would not apply to
foreign competitors.
PROF. BISCHEL: So you are saying that in order to remain competitive abroad you would not be able to raise prices?
MR. CooKENBoo: I presume there are some tax "changes" that they
could make in the rules that would not lead to any increase in taxes.
Obviously those are not going to have any effect. But if there are substantive changes that do lead to increases in taxes, if it is a U.S. tax
increase on a U.S. company-or a German tax increase on a German
company-and that is unilateral (not accomplished by an international
tax treaty), then companies domiciled in the country increasing tax
unilaterally are going to suffer. That is sort of like passing on percentage
depletion in a free market. People say why in the world didn't the oil
industry get rid of percentage depletion because it would affect all oil
companies operating in the United States and the price would go up to
take care of it? If in fact the price is set by the world market, you cannot
pass on a tax increase levied unilaterally; that is a basic principle of
international economics. If the price of Xis determined internationally,
producers of X in Country A have a unilateral tax increase. They either
absorb it or they go out of business. There is no way that they can pass
it on because the price is determined in the world market. People will
go elsewhere if producers in A try to charge more. That sort of situation
is faced when there is a unilateral tax increase on companies domiciled
in one country.
PROF. BISCHEL: Approximately what percentage of the world market
do the U.S. multinational oil companies control?
MR. CooKENBoo: I am sorry but I cannot answer the question with
any precision. It will vary substantially depending on whether you are
talking about production or refining or marketing or that sort of thing.
I would say that in refining and marketing, all American oil companies
together account for about one-third of the world market excluding
North American and the centrally planned economies.
PROF. BISCHEL: What about production?
MR. CooKENBoo: That depends on the current status of the participation negotiations in the Persian Gulf. That situation is in such a state
of flux that we cannot compute a number that is very meaningful. I
would say about one-half of production in the same area.
PROF. BISCHEL: Are there any questions from the audience?
MR. FINLAY: I do not think nearly enough attention for a mixed
audience like this has been given to the proposition that all taxation
should be geared to the public purposes that are designed to be served.
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You mentioned, for example, tankers. It is a perennial preoccupation of
the maritime unions in the United States to try to get legislation
through Congress to force American companies out of the foreign flag
tanker business under the naive assumption that if that legislation is
passed the American companies will have more American flag tankers.
That is simply not a fact. An American flag tanker is so costly due to
high American construction costs and high crew costs that it is simply
not competitive except in the protected intracoastal trade. The same
thing applies on these foreign oil companies. If a taxation rate is imposed on American oil companies it makes them non-competitive with
the British, the Dutch, the German and the French oil companies. They
will simply lose the market. Now the biggest single contribution to the
American balance of payments is the earnings of the American oil companies on their business abroad. On domestic taxation you have to
consider the total package. In return on investment over the period of
years the oil companies have been approximately equal or a little below
manufacturing in general, and that means that depletion allowance is
really geared into the price structure and gets back to the public or the
government one way or the other. Just the other day there was an offshore lease sale in the Gulf of Mexico with bonus payments of a billion
six hundred odd million dollars. On December 20, 1973, there was a
lease sale of bonus payments of a billion five hundred million dollars.
Now those payments, in effect, are a payment in advance for the benefits of the depletion allowance and other tax benefits. The total production from the Gulf of Mexico since the first offshore leases has not, as I
understand it, repaid the investment already made by the oil industry.
Is that correct, Mr. Cookenboo?
MR. CooKENBOO: It was correct a couple of years ago. With the
tremendous bonus payments that have been made on these last two
lease sales, I would feel sure it is correct again today, if it was not in
between. If you include bonus payments for the last two or three years
for future production, I am sure that is true.
MR. FINLAY: Now, by the same token on the depletion allowance,
when the 5.5 percent depletion was made in 1967, that was roughly
equivalent to a five percent reduction in the sales price of the oil. The
production today with this tremendous shortage is less than it was at
the time of the depletion allowance. I believe it is less than it was a year
ago and the combination of the reduction and the depletion allowance
puts us in a ridiculously low federal ceiling on the price of natural gas
sold in interstate commerce. The average rate today, even with recent
liberalizations, is only about $.22 or $.23 per thousand cubic feet which
is equivalent to about $1.20 or $1.25 per barrel of crude oil. This has
resulted in a decline in the incentive to look for oil in this country. You
must look at the total picture and the public purpose that is to be
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served. It would be a terrible mistake for anyone in the audience to try
to make a judgment on the basis just of a technical discussion of tax
provisions.
MR. Ross: Let me just illustrate the complexity of this problem. If
you assume that what he said is correct, then we have, in effect, for
many years encouraged a lower price for gasoline in the country, which
as an economist you will have to agree has encouraged more driving in
larger cars, less conservation measures, and less concern for ecology. Has
it been right for this country to encourage all this additional resource
use by providing gasoline at below market price to the American public?
Has that been a good thing for this country over the past quarter century? I do not know the answers to these questions, but you must ask
all those kinds of questions to know what you want to do.
MR: CooKENBoo: I do not want to get off into a discussion of the
economics of domestic percentage depletion allowance, but let me say
that as an economist I would not subscribe to the idea that the depletion
allowance has inevitably cheapened petroleum relative to a neutral tax
system, evaluated on the basis of what kind of resource allocation we
would pave in the absence of the corporate income tax. The corporate
income tax clearly discriminates against capital intensive industries,
and percentage depletion can be looked on as a counter-discriminatory
device to offset a discrimination which is inherent in the tax law.
MR. Ross: I do not necessarily ascribe to the assumption either. I
was just taking Mr. Finlay's assumption and showing you how to take
it one more level which is, I think, something that we all had better do.
PROF. BISCHEL: Let me take it one more level than that and point
out that the Treasury Department estimates that if percentage depletion were removed, it would generate about $2 billion per year or more
in revenue which would be about $.02 per gallon of gasoline.
MR. Ross: Well, they are not sure that there will not be readjustments. All those revenue estimates are based on certain assumptions,
and if habits change, which they might well do, I think that even with
the embargo off, the price of gasoline may stay high even if there is
adequate supply. People may change their habits; they may buy smaller
cars or do other things over a prolonged period of time. There may be
an immediate impact holding things the way they are in terms of consumption.
PROF. BISCHEL: I think it is true that percentage depletion obviously
is directly or indirectly a subsidy to the consumer.
MR. CooKENBoo: I cannot agree with that.
MR. Ross: I am not sure I agree with that either. It may be a subsidy
of the company or a little bit to each or it may have all kinds of impacts.
PROF. BISCHEL: Even if the cost were totally passed forward to the
consumer, the increase in the cost of gasoline would be sufficient from
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what is evident today to deter or conserve our energy if you are talking
of a couple of cents a gallon. That is not a very large figure, is it?
MR. Ross: That depends on how many gallons you use. It might be
for a lot of people.
PROF. BISCHEL: If you are talking about the difference between $.48
to $.50 per gallon.
MR. Ross: I think it is a question of mental attitude too. There was
a lot of overreaction to the embargo but at the same time, people really
began to consider whether they really wanted a small or large car,
whether they liked carpools, riding to work and talking with three or four
other people. One thing that happens out of this is that for quite noneconomic or non-tax reasons people are made conscious of things, and
their perceptions and habits change, and I think sometimes that is good.
MR. GRIFFIN: It seems to me that in much of this rather technical
analysis of the individual tax provisions, in much of the discussion,
especially by Mr. Cookenboo and Mr. Finlay, the focus has been on the
competitive positions of the oil companies as a whole and what would
happen to American oil companies if certain changes were made in
American tax law that were not made in Germany, Greece, etc. I would
just like to observe as a lone dissenter (and get the panel's opinion on
all of the evidence that has come out, both in the Church Hearings and
in earlier hearings, on the fact that there is no competition between the
major oil companies) that there is an oil cartel in fact fostered by the
U.S. Government. If you accept that point of view then all these arguments about the fact that if we raise the American tax laws we will be
at the mercy of the foreign oil companies suddenly goes out the window,
because that is not the way the system works at all. Oil industry people
will always quote you figures that there are so many thousand producers, so many thousand refiners, and so many thousand independents.
The point is: how many sizeable multinational oil companies are there
that have anything more than about two percent of the market? The
answer gets to be 18, 20, 25 or something like that. I would just like to
get your reaction to all of the evidence that some of Senator Church's
committee has been bringing in. Is it really competition?
MR. CooKENBoo: I do not think that you can demonstrate that there
is a high degree of concentration in the oil industry internationally except in the producing stage-where there is a high degree of concentration of country, not company, control of the market. There is no question that if you look at the tanker stage of the business or any other stage
for that matter-and this has been evaluated by other people who are
neutral-there is not a high degree of concentration in the oil industry.
It is a competitive industry.
MR. FINLAY: I do not think there is the slightest doubt about that.
Just consider the percentage figures. Sixty percent of the market can
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keep 40 percent from setting a price level at a point where the other 60
percent cannot greatly increase their supply. Right at the present time
it happens to be even with the lifting of the embargo, there is just about
a balance between crude production and global demand. When you do
not have a surplus supply situation, you have a seller's market, but up
until very recent months, it has been a buyer's market. It has been
totally impossible for the larger companies to dominate the market internationally, just as it is totally impossible for them to do it in this
country, where you have 140 or 150 separate companies in the refining
business, about 5,000 companies in the producing business and 20,000
to 40,000 people in the distribution business.
PROF. FRIED: It would seem, historically, that percentage depletion
and the intangible drilling costs deduction were incentives for domestic
exploration of oil. I would question whether these incentives should
apply to foreign source income as well as foreign development?
MR. CooKENBoo: Historically there has been no distinction.
PROF. FRIED: The original laws were passed when foreign development and foreign exploration of oil was either nil or minimal.
M~. Ross: That is probably true.
MR. CooKENBOO: Percentage depletion is simply a statutory replacement of its antecedent, "discovery value," which goes back to the
very origins of the income tax laws; and there was an international oil
industry at that time, just as well as there is now. The basic issue of this
question is: do you want American companies to continue to compete
in the international business? We have our package of incentives or tax
treatment, and the other countries have their own; but if you change
ours, then you are going to make our companies somewhat less competitive. It depends on what kind of changes you make. If you do want
American companies to continue to compete, changing the package is
undoubtedly going to affect their ability to do that.
MR. Ross: Let me see if I can elucidate the issue a little. I think it
is fair to say that the application abroad of the intangible deduction and
percentage depletion did not draw substantial public attention when
they were first put in the law. I think what Mr. Cookenboo is doing now
and what the companies are doing now is saying there is a different
rationale for this allowance domestically than on foreign production.
Domestically, the rationale is in the area of incentive, or if he does not
want to call it incentive, he will say "helpful to a capital intensive
industry." He will say something which is designed to justify it in terms
of encouraging or keeping up the level of domestic discovery. On the
foreign side, the rationale that they are using is different. It is that to
really be competitive in the foreign oil field you have to be nearly tax
exempt on it. If you put a little tax on it, we can probably absorb it; if
you put a lot of tax on it, the Dutch, French and British will take it
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away. I think many people are aware that this is the rationale in the
foreign tax field. The underlying issue which is being focused on is: what
difference does it make that it is a Delaware company pulling it out of
Saudi Arabia? Would it matter one iota to our national security, our
national health, welfare or anything else if the Japanese were pulling it
out of Saudi Arabia? We can obviously put a sufficient tax on to prohibit
a Delaware company from extracting oil from Saudi Arabia. The question is, do we want to? There is a middle ground though; could you pay
some taxes and still do that kind of business? The companies' position
rhetorically and in their public posture is that the status quo is what
we need. I am not so sure that they are not prepared to pay some kind
of so-called minimum tax to their home country and pretty much have
the status quo. But, basically there is a different rationale for domestic
than for foreign.
MR. HAIGHT: There has been reference to the oil industry being a
capital intensive industry, but the question is: how much tax should be
taken out of the individual industry? Doesn't that question turn on what
we want the industry to do? Do we want more oil produced by the
industry worldwide? If we do, we have to allow the industry the means
to get the capital. Recently the Chase Bank made a a survey of the next
15 years capital requirement of the industry. I do not remember the
figures, but they are very big indeed and there is a big gap between what
the industry can generate itself out of profits remaining after taxes and
dividends, and what it will be required to spend. If the tax bite is
increased, it seems to me that the industry will have that much less to
use, and we will just have that much less oil. Maybe we do not need that.
Politically, in this country everybody is screaming for oil and it does not
seem to me to make any sense at all to hobble the industry today
because the amount of capital that it will require over the next 15 years
bankers say just is not available.
MR. n'EscLAPON: With respect to the capital needs of the oil companies, aren't there some oil companies that are government-owned and
perhaps have easier access to capital sources? And what impact does
that have on their competitive strength?
MR. CooKENBOO: There are some that are government-owned and
some partly government-owned and subsidized. The Italian company,
for example, ENI, is government-owned and theoretically it is supposed
to make a profit; but I believe it does receive an annual contribution
from the government. I believe the French government company is also
subsidized. Then there are other forms of government assistance to privately owned companies, which comes to the same thing.
MR. FINLAY: To give you an order of magnitude, Mr. Cookenboo's
company announced that they are going to spend $4 billion in capital
expenditures in the year 1974 and $16 billion over a four year period.
Now that is a single company, and if you assume that they have an eight
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or nine percent market share, multiply it by 11 or 12 times $16 billion
over a four year period and that gives you something in the magnitude
of $150 to $160 billion over four years.
MR. CooKENBOO: In terms of 1974 prices, the U.S. industry needs
to spend something like $25 billion a year from now to 1985 in order to
achieve about 83 to 85 percent self-sufficiency. That does not include
things like electric transmission; it includes refining, pipelines, and production. Historically, we have spent perhaps $8 billion per year.
MR. Ross: I think this gets back to Mr. Griffin's question. What is
the structure of the industry? What should it be? Could it be structured
in a way which would meet the needs in a more efficient manner? Is this
the only way it can be done? Is this the best way? Are there no improvements that can be made, no new efficiencies that can be found? I think
that these are the questions, and they are broader than antitrust policy.
They go to a whole consideration of a major segment of the economy.
MR. n'EscLAPON: Mr. Ross, part of the question also relates to a
comment that you made earlier in your presentation about the need for
a multilateral approach to the problem. Perhaps a consequence of that
would be increasing the degree of partnership of producing countries,
especially where the capital needs are concerned. A great deal of the
capital that is required now is to be found in the Middle East thanks to
the increased boost in prices and thus, if you need that much money it
is well worth looking at that as a source of capital.
MR. Ross: Suppose the American companies did not come in and
provide the capital to drill up Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabians had
to take their own money and invest their own capital into the development of their resources. From a political standpoint, would we, as a
country that imports from them, get better treatment as a consumer if
they ran the entire economic risk of it themselves?
MR. HAIGHT: You can look at Mexico as an example of a country
that has taken over its industry and operates it itself. The government
does it; you find that the industry is not very efficiently run. The Mexicans are quite happy to have this industry for themselves and run it
themselves, but that would not indicate that the government ownership
and management of an industry such as this would be of great benefit
to other countries. It may be that Saudi Arabia and the other Arab
countries would be very good at managing their own industries and
contributing to the world what the oil companies in the past have contributed. But the political picture in the Middle East does not indicate
all that amount of cooperation and stability. It seems to me a very
hazardous prospect to think of the oil industry being in the hands of a
half-dozen or dozen Middle East governments that will quarrel among
themselves as to who is going to do what. Perhaps all will decide they
will sit on their bag of gold like bacteria in Wagner's Ring, and just not
let anybody have any. Or, they may decide to let the Europeans have
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it and not the Americans, or the Asians or the Africans and they will
build up Africa as a great economic power.
MR. CooKENBoo: That is why I think that diversification of international supply is clearly a valid policy for this country even if we succeed
in making ourselves independent, because there is still a potential economic power bloc which can affect us indirectly.
MR. Ross: I think that one thing the discussion has shown is that
you ultimately come back to political questions, that even things as
technical as a three-tier limitation system really involve making political decisions which you disguise as technical tax questions. You could
put in a four-tier limitation system or a six-tier system with lots of
language but ultimately the question is what is it designed to do and
ultimately it gets back to the question of what our national interest is
in the world. Are the companies that control such a large part of Middle
Eastern oil production furthering our interest by doing this and is this
why we provide them with a tax package that gives them tax exemptions?
PROF. BISCHEL: We are running out of time. Maybe I could ask each
of the panelists to give a one minute summation if they wish.
MR. CooKENBOO: I believe I have had my say.
MR. Ross: I just want to congratulate Professor Goldie and the
program. I think it is a very timely program and I think this kind of
inquiry is important because I think too much has just been taken for
granted about this whole area.
PROF. BISCHEL: I would like to concur on just what Mr. Ross said.
Thank you gentlemen.
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